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Introduction 
The recent judgment of the Thimphu High Court in the 
defamation case involving the former Director of Revenue and 
Customs, Sangay Zam, the present Finance Minster, Lyonpo 
Wangdi Norbu, and Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba, on the one hand, 
and the former authorised agent of PlayWin online lottery, 
Sangay Dorji, raises some interesting questions about the 
manner in which reputational interests of individuals are 
protected under Bhutanese law. 
 
The case, which arose out of comments made by Sangay Dorji 
at a workshop on “Review of Anti-Corruption Strategies” 
conducted by the Anti Corruption Commission of Bhutan in 
August 2007, was first filed in the Thimphu District Court by 
the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) which reportedly 
acted at the behest of the three complainants.  The District 
Court delivered a judgment in July 2008 in which it 
dismissed the case and laid down certain principles to be 
followed in defamation suits.   
 
The case was then taken in appeal to the High Court by the 
OAG.  A Full Bench of the High Court heard arguments from 
both sides and delivered the abovementioned judgment on 30 
December 2008 which effectively affirmed the verdict of the 
District Court, holding it to be “fair and reasonable enough”.1  
                                              
* Law Commissioner, Northern Ireland (UK), and Senior Lecturer, 
School of Law, University of Ulster.  
1 “Defamation suit comes unstuck”, Kuensel, 31 December 2008, 
p.4.  The judgment of the High Court was rendered in Dzongkha and 
since no English translation has been published, the author has 
relied on the above newspaper report for guidance. 
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Basic principles 
Before we analyse the two judgments, it would be helpful to 
cast a quick glance at the basic principles of, and approaches 
to, defamation law in some major jurisdictions.  For the sake 
of convenience and to keep this discussion within 
manageable limits, reference will be made particularly to the 
position prevailing in England and the United States of 
America, two of the most widely respected legal jurisdictions 
in the world. 
 
The law of defamation rests on the value that people attach to 
the reputation of individuals.  In most countries, a person’s 
reputation is considered to be as important as his personal 
possessions – in other words, the right to reputation is 
treated as being on par with the right to property.  
Shakespeare put it even higher when he said: 
 
“Who steals my purse, steals trash; ‘tis something, 
nothing; 
‘Twas mine, ‘tis his, and has been slave to thousands; 
But he that filches from me my good name, 
Robs me of that which not enriches him, 
And makes me poor indeed.”2 
 
Therefore, just as the law provides for compensation to be 
paid when a person is wrongfully deprived of his property, so 
the law also requires the payment of compensation to anyone 
whose reputation is damaged.  Additionally, some countries 
also allow for punishment – in the form of a fine or 
imprisonment – for the defamer, although this aspect of the 
law is fast falling into disuse.3 
 
There are two types of defamation: libel and slander.  Libel 
consists of defamation in a permanent form, e.g. in print, 
                                              
2 Othello, Act 111, Scene 3, 167. 
3 Most Western countries have either abolished, or abandoned the 
use of, prosecutions for defamation.  However, such prosecutions 
continue in a number of Asian jurisdictions, e.g. India, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Thailand. 
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tape, or compact disc, while slander consists of defamation in 
non-permanent or transient form, e.g. in spoken words.  
Sometimes, the same matter may constitute both libel and 
slander: for example, when a person utters defamatory words 
during a live radio broadcast (slander) which is then recorded 
on tape by another person (libel).  Some legal systems provide 
for special rules in respect of slander but, generally speaking, 
the effects of both types of defamation are the same in law. 
 
Arguably, the most important question that arises is: what 
constitutes defamation?  Although there are some variations 
between countries, the most commonly used definition states 
that defamation consists of any act which results in the 
reputation of a person being lowered in the eyes of other 
right-thinking members of society.  Note that the lowering of 
the reputation must be in the eyes of others, not the person 
concerned himself.  This means that, if someone were to say 
something highly abusive about another person to his face, 
the abused person cannot complain of being defamed, 
however hurt he may be by the abuse.  Note also that the 
effect of a defamatory statement will be judged on right-
thinking members of society, viz. reasonable people of 
ordinary sensibilities, not someone who is hypersensitive or 
very thick-skinned. 
 
It is important, of course, that the statement being 
complained of must be false.  True accusations against 
someone, even if it has the effect of lowering his reputation, 
cannot amount to defamation.  This means that truth can be 
a defence by anyone accused of defaming another person. 
 
The law recognises a number of other defences as well to a 
charge of defamation.  The most commonly used among 
these, particularly by the media, is fair comment and 
privilege.  Fair comment involves the defendant arguing that 
the statement complained of was an honest and reasonable 
opinion expressed by him without malice on a matter of 
public interest and upon facts which had been clearly 
established.  In order to succeed, the comment should have 
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been expressed in moderate language.  It should not be 
motivated by personal grudge or other selfish considerations. 
 
As for privilege, the law recognises certain occasions when the 
public interest requires complete freedom of speech, including 
protection from proceedings for defamation, even if the speech 
is subsequently shown to be false or mistaken.  There are two 
types of privilege: absolute privilege and qualified privilege.  
Absolute privilege allows a person to say or write anything, 
even maliciously, and still not face the possibility of 
defamation suits.  The most commonly cited example of this 
type of privilege is speeches made by Members of Parliament 
on the floor of the House.4  Qualified privilege, on the other 
hand, requires that those making statements which may turn 
out to be defamatory do so without malice.  The basis of 
qualified privilege is that the speaker or writer has a duty to 
say or write the words complained of to protect a legitimate 
interest, and the audience to which the words are addressed 
has an interest in receiving those words.  An example of 
qualified privilege would be job references: here, the person 
writing a reference has a duty to speak frankly about the 
person being written about, and the person who has sought 
the reference has an interest in obtaining a frank opinion 
about him. 
Qualified privilege and the media 
In recent years, the defense of qualified privilege has been 
creatively adapted by the courts in some countries to give the 
media a greater degree of freedom to comment on matters of 
public interest without fear of being sued for defamation.  
This has been done on the premise that journalists have a 
duty to tell their readers, listeners and viewers about matters 
of public interest and the readers, listeners and viewers have 
an interest in receiving such information.  The leading case 
which laid down this principle is Reynolds v. Times 
                                              
4 It needs to be remembered, however, that the extent of an MP’s 
freedom to speak in Parliament is limited by the control exercised by 
the Speaker of the House. 
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Newspapers,5 which was decided by the House of Lords in 
England.  In this case, the court set out the following 10 
factors that judges should take into account when deciding 
whether the duty and interest tests were met sufficiently for a 
media defendant to succeed in a defamation case: 
 
1. The seriousness of the allegation: the more serious the 
charge, the more the public is misinformed and the 
individual harmed, if the allegation is not true. 
2. The nature of the information, and the extent to which 
the subject-matter is a matter of public concern. 
3. The source of the information. Some informants have 
no direct knowledge of the events. Some have their 
own axes to grind, or are being paid for their stories. 
4. The steps taken to verify the information. 
5. The status of the information. The allegation may have 
already been the subject of an investigation which 
commands respect. 
6. The urgency of the matter. News is often a perishable 
commodity. 
7. Whether comment was sought from the claimant. He 
may have information others do not possess or have 
not disclosed. An approach to the claimant will not 
always be necessary. 
8. Whether the article contained the gist of the claimant’s 
side of the story. 
9. The tone of the article. A newspaper can raise queries 
or call for an investigation. It need not adopt 
allegations as statements of fact. 
10. The circumstances of the publication, including the 
timing.6 
 
The Reynolds’ defence, as it has come to be called, has been 
seen as furthering the cause of media freedom in a significant 
way, especially in countries like England where, traditionally, 
                                              
5 [1998] 3 All ER 961. 
6 The above list was prepared by Lord Nicholls, one of the Law Lords 
who gave judgment in the case.  The word ‘claimant’ used in the list 
refers to the person bringing the case, i.e. the ‘plaintiff’. 
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the law of defamation has been seen as a major hurdle for 
investigative journalism.  It needs to be remembered, 
however, that this defence can only be availed of by media 
defendants and then only in matters involving the public 
interest. 
 
This defence has since been developed further, notably in the 
case of Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe,7 where the 
House of Lords ruled that, as long as the media engaged in 
‘responsible journalism’, viz. checked its facts, behaved 
reasonably and ethically, did not sensationalise the story, 
offered the alleged victim of defamation an opportunity of 
‘setting the record straight’ in relation to any errors that may 
have crept into the story, and acted in the public interest, it 
could escape liability for defamation.  The result is that, as 
the authors of a leading textbook put it, “[t]he writer and 
publisher on subjects of public interest will henceforth only 
be liable if he has acted negligently – by putting defamations 
believed to be true in the public domain without making 
reasonable checks.”8   
 
The use of qualified privilege in favour of the media  – albeit 
not to the same extent as laid down in the Jameel case – has 
precedents in other countries as well.  Courts in Australia 
and NZ, for example, have in the late-1990s delivered 
judgments that have had a liberalising effect on the law of 
defamation.9 
Public figures and the law of defamation 
One of the other important aspects of the law of defamation 
which is worth noting is the distinction that is made between 
public figures and ordinary citizens by the courts of certain 
                                              
7 [2006] UKHL 44. 
8 Robertson and Nicol (2008), Media Law, London: Penguin, 5th ed., 
p. 100. 
9 E.g. Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 
520 (Australia); Lange v. Atkinson No. 1 [1998] 3 NZLR 424 and No. 
2 [2000} NZLR 385 (New Zealand). 
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countries. The most prominent of such countries is the 
United States of America where, in a series of decisions going 
back to at least 1964, the Supreme Court has held that 
public figures should enjoy a lesser degree of protection 
against defamation.10  As a result, if a public figure was to 
bring a suit for defamation against, say, a journalist, the suit 
would be thrown out by an American court unless the public 
figure was able to show actual malice (e.g. a personal grudge 
or an ulterior motive) on the part of the journalist. 
 
This distinction has proved controversial.  The media have 
generally welcomed it, arguing that it affords greater 
protection for investigative journalism against those in the 
public eye (especially politicians), but others have strongly 
criticised it, arguing that it is discriminatory.  One of the 
problems is that there can be disputes about whether 
someone is a public figure or not.  This is particularly the 
case with minor celebrities who may not hold any public 
office or exercise any public function but who may simply be 
famous by virtue of their success in a certain profession, 
calling or occupation.  Such persons may feel genuinely 
aggrieved that the law treats them – and their desire for 
privacy and dignity – less favourably than many of their less 
well-known fellow citizens. 
 
An example of possible injustice as a result of the ‘public 
figure’ rule arose in a case involving the former Prime 
Minister of India, Morarji Desai.  Mr Desai was the subject of 
an allegedly defamatory allegation in a book authored by the 
American writer, Seymour Hersh.11 Since the book was 
sought to be sold in both the United States and India, and 
since Mr Desai had a reputation to defend in both countries, 
he sued Mr Hersh and the publisher of the book in the courts 
in both places.  Unfortunately for him, his case in the US was 
thrown out because American law did not allow public figures 
                                              
10 See, e.g. New York Times v. Sullivan 401 US 265 (1964). 
11 The book in question, The Price of Power, critiqued the role played 
by Dr Henry Kissinger in the shaping and conduct of American 
foreign policy. 
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to bring defamation cases unless they could show that the 
alleged defamer had acted maliciously.  Indian law did not 
make any such distinction, but Mr Desai was still unable to 
obtain any redress because civil litigation in India is 
notorious for its delays (such cases often take up to twenty 
years or more to be heard), and Mr Desai, who was already in 
his seventies at the time, died before his suit came up for 
hearing.12 
The Sangay Dorji case 
Bhutanese law does, like its counterparts in other South 
Asian countries, allow for both civil and criminal liability to 
attach to defamatory statements.  Indeed, the Sangay Dorji 
case involved the use of criminal law, i.e. Section 317 of the 
Bhutan Penal Code which says that: 
 
“A defendant shall be guilty of the offence of defamation if 
the defendant intentionally causes damage to the 
reputation of another person or a legal person by 
communicating false or distorted information about the 
person’s action, motive, character or reputation.” 
 
What is striking about the Sangay Dorji case is that the 
courts – at both District and High Court levels – have thought 
fit to go beyond the standard requirements applicable in most 
Anglo-Saxon countries and introduced two further elements 
to be established by the prosecution before they can procure 
a conviction, namely: 
 
1. that, if the person aggrieved by the alleged defamation (the 
complainant) is a public figure, the prosecutor must prove 
that the person or persons responsible for the defamation (the 
accused) acted with actual malice; and 
 
2. that prosecutor must further prove that the accused knew 
that the statement in question was false when he made it. 
                                              
12 In most countries, defamation suits come to an end when the 
plaintiff dies. 
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While the first stipulation has some precedents to support it 
(e.g. the law in the United States noted above – although the 
Bhutanese courts do not refer to any precedents), the second 
is somewhat unique, at least in the common law world.  It 
imposes a higher than normal burden on the part of the 
prosecution and therefore makes successful prosecutions 
much more difficult.  However, it would be lauded by those 
free speech campaigners who have, over the years, argued 
that the traditional approach of requiring the defendant to 
prove the truth of the alleged defamatory statement was 
unfair and out of line with the normal rules of burden of proof 
in criminal cases. 
 
Although the judgments in the Sangay Dorji case do not 
elaborate on the concept of ‘public figure’, they do make it 
clear that this concept is “broader than celebrities and 
politicians”.13 Accordingly, they have concluded that Mrs 
Sangay Zam, the then Director of Revenue and Customs (who 
was one of the complainants in this case), was – despite being 
neither a celebrity nor a politician – a public figure.  How the 
concept of ‘public figure’ is developed in the future by the 
Bhutanese courts will be important, because that will 
determine the outcome of many defamation cases.  Obviously, 
some caution is required lest the law of defamation becomes 
skewed against a whole class of people who, sometimes for no 
fault of their own, find themselves in the public eye. 
 
Another noteworthy aspect of the judgments is that the 
District Court has attempted to signal its preference for 
reduced protection for the reputation of public officials as a 
group compared to other citizens. “The jurisprudence adopted 
by the Bhutanese court,” it says, “is clear that public officials 
enjoy lesser protection of their reputation since they are 
routinely exposed to public opinion because of their public 
profile.”14  This may be seen as a welcome development from 
the point of view of freedom of speech in a democracy, 
                                              
13 Unnumbered para. 10, Part II of the District Court judgment. 
14 Unnumbered para. 17, ibid. 
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because it echoes the liberalising trend evident in a number 
other countries in this regard.  As far back as 1993 the House 
of Lords in London expressed the view that if public bodies 
were allowed to sue for defamation, they might misuse that 
power to stifle legitimate criticism of their activities.15  This, 
said the court, would have a “chilling effect” on free speech.  
In the words of one of the judges, it would be “a serious 
interference . . . if the wealth of the State, derived from the 
State’s subjects, could be used to launch against those 
subjects actions for defamation because they have, falsely 
and unfairly it may be, criticised or condemned the 
management of the country.”16  In England, it is now not 
possible for local authorities, government-run corporations 
and political parties to sue for defamation.  This principle has 
also been accepted by the Supreme Court of India. 
 
The Thimphu District Court has been equally vigorous in its 
affirmation of this principle.  It has said that 
 
“in a modern democratic society, constructive criticism by 
any individual citizen against the government should be 
accepted as a necessary evil for effective governance.  It is 
only the freedom of expression and thought that would 
translate the true meaning of democracy [sic].”17 
The role of the Attorney General 
One of the particularly controversial aspects of the Sangay 
Dorji case appears to be the involvement of the Office of the 
Attorney General in launching the prosecution – and the 
subsequent appeal – which led to the two court judgments.  
The OAG is reported to have acted on the basis of a directive 
issued by the Cabinet Secretary, but this came in for some 
criticism by the courts.  The judges noted that, although the 
Attorney-General has a “special responsibility to be a 
                                              
15 Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers [1993] AC 534. 
16 Ibid. At 557-59 (per Lord Keith). 
17 Ibid., para. 5.2 (Note: from the copy of the judgment obtained by 
the author, it is not entirely clear why some paragraphs have been 
numbered and others have not.) 
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guardian of rule of law, which include guardian [sic] of the 
public interest,” his responsibility for individual criminal 
prosecutions 
 
“must be undertaken on strictly objective and legal criteria, 
free of any political considerations and independent of the 
traditional cabinet decision.  Any deviation would lead to 
dysfunction of the democratic process and will be 
becoming more pronounce [sic] in the near future.  No 
prosecution of this nature may be initiated in the court at 
the cost of the public purse.”18 
 
The High Court reportedly endorsed this view and suggested 
that “[s]uch cases should not be represented by the OAG and 
left to the aggrieved individual.”19  The basis for this finding 
was that the alleged defamatory statement did not materially 
affect the reputation of the Revenue and Customs 
Department of which the aggrieved person, Mrs Sangay Zam, 
was at the relevant time the Secretary. 
 
Quite clearly, this is a matter which deserves serious 
consideration. Where public expenditure is involved, it is 
important that the highest standards of probity are adhered 
to.  For this reason, it would be desirable if proper norms and 
guidelines are framed about the extent, and the manner of 
exercise of, the Attorney-General’s discretion in such matters.  
These norms and guidelines should have regard not only to 
the peculiar needs of Bhutanese society but also to best 
practices in other democracies. 
Other issues 
The Sangay Dorji case raises a number of other issues as well 
which it would be beyond the scope of the present article to 
elaborate on.  These include: 
 
                                              
18 Ibid., para. 5.3. 
19 “Defamation suit comes unstuck”, Kuensel, December 31, 2008, p. 
4. 
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1. the manner in which the defence of ‘truth’ vis-a-vis 
defamation has been dealt with by the courts, and its 
apparent conflation with the defence of ‘fair 
comment’;20   
2. the use and evidentiary value of Parliamentary 
Resolutions in defamation proceedings (and in court 
proceedings generally);21 
3. the manner of collection of evidence prior to the 
launching of proceedings for defamation;22 
4. the proper scope and limits of the offence of ‘sedition’ 
and its relevance to cases involving alleged attacks on 
individual reputation;23 and 
5. the proper scope and limits of the offence of ‘spreading 
false information’ and its relevance to cases involving 
alleged attacks on individual reputation.24 
 
More generally, the case points to the need for a wider and 
deeper debate involving legal professionals, policy analysts, 
the government’s law officers, the media, and members of the 
public who may have an interest in such matters, over the 
place that defamation law should occupy in a new democratic 
Bhutan, the relative merits of resort to prosecutions on the 
one hand and civil proceedings on the other for the 
vindication of individual reputations, and the strengths and 
weaknesses of the present Bhutanese law on defamation.   
Conclusion 
The Sangay Dorji case offers both opportunities and 
challenges for the reform of media law in Bhutan.  It is 
                                              
20 See unnumbered para. 15 of the District Court judgment. 
21 See unnumbered paras. 13-15, ibid. 
22 In the present case, the Office of Attorney General reportedly 
prepared and put out questionnaires which those attending the ACC 
workshop were asked to complete and return to the OAG.  Some of 
the recipients of the questionnaire were apparently unsure of the 
legal status of the document and their own legal rights in relation to 
it.  
23 See Part III of the District Court judgment. 
24 See Part I, ibid. 
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arguably the first case in which the courts have undertaken a 
major assessment of the complex issues that defamation law 
often throws up.  The importance of engaging with such 
issues is heightened by the fact that Bhutan now has a 
written constitution which guarantees freedom of speech and 
expression and which therefore requires policy makers, 
prosecutors and the judiciary to ensure that the correct 
balance is struck between that important freedom and other 
competing interests such as the right to personal reputation.  
As Bhutanese democracy matures, and as the country’s 
economic, social and cultural development gathers pace, 
more and more cases of this kind are likely to emerge, calling 
for creative solutions and sophisticated approaches to dispute 
resolution. 
 
For all the limitations of Bhutan’s nascent legal infrastructure 
– including obvious constraints of judicial capacity – both the 
Thimphu District Court and the High Court have, in the 
present case, made a promising, if imperfect, start which, on 
the whole, augurs well for the healthy development of 
defamation law in the future.  Quite clearly, a number of 
crinkles need to be ironed out and a range of both conceptual 
and practical issues need to be clarified fairly quickly.  The 
Bhutanese political and judicial leadership would do well to 
look at the experience of media law reform in comparable 
jurisdictions elsewhere, and also seek expert advice from 
those with an understanding of the needs and aspirations of 
transitional societies. Recent years have seen remarkable 
developments in defamation law and practice all over the 
world, and this branch of the law is still evolving. 
